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Comrades! Public teachers! You gave the people literacy, now you must give them 
development! Make free Russia’s conscious citizens out of yesterday’s village philistines! 
(From educational pamphlet, 1917)1 
The Provisional Government and the soviets regarded the campaigns to make 
‘yesterday’s village philistines’ into conscious citizens as pivotal to the success or 
failure of the new regime. Without popular support, their stated goals of overseeing 
democratic elections, keeping Russia in the war, maintaining food supplies and 
preventing civic disorder were unachievable. Ordinary people were to be educated so 
that they would understand their new duties and responsibilities, as well as their new 
freedoms. These attempts to educate the population about the new political climate 
and transform their cultural lives were regarded by educated society as their great 
opportunity to bridge the gulf separating them from Russia’s ordinary people.2 The 
political elite sought to bring cultural transformation to ordinary people through 
literacy, political education and citizens’ training (grazhdanskoe vospitanie). While 
educational literature recognised that mass political literacy could not be achieved in 
the short term, ordinary people had to understand the rudimentaries of political life if 
the forthcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly were to be meaningful. 
Ultimately, while cultural enlightenment campaigns engaged ordinary people in the 
national political sphere, they failed to win consensus on the nature and direction of 
the new regime. Ordinary people did not support the Provisional Government’s 
  3 
programmes because they did not agree with their messages, not because they did not 
understand them.  
This article uses a close study of the provinces of Nizhegorod and Kazan to 
explore the cultural enlightenment campaigns that went on across Russia, in towns, 
villages and factories. Both provinces had pockets of heavy industry, ancient and 
well-established capitals, and large areas dominated by peasant landholding, which 
enable us to see interactions between elites and populace in both urban and rural 
settings. Both provinces were considered to be part of Russia’s fertile ‘black earth’ 
belt, and had correspondingly high levels of agricultural production. Kazan was 
notable for its large non-Russian population, foremost among which were Tatar, 
Chuvash and Cheremis, or Marii, peoples. These two provinces cannot be taken to be 
‘typical’ of Russia as a whole, as the Russian Empire’s regional diversity precludes 
the drawing of broad generalisations. Study of these two provinces does however 
allow us to explore regional and local manifestations of cultural enlightenment 
campaigns both in well developed provincial capitals, and in rural areas. In particular, 
we will focus on the ways in which local political elites communicated with their 
citizens, both urban and rural, in 1917.  
This article intersects with the rich and developing recent historiography on 
relations between ordinary people and the political elite in the late Imperial and 
revolutionary periods, and on questions of citizenship. Scholars have become 
increasingly sensitive to the importance of educated society’s cultural constructions of 
peasants.3  Drawing on this rich literature, my research has found that the political 
elite’s perceptions of a ‘backward’ peasantry informed their relations with the rural 
population in 1917, as it had in the pre-revolutionary period. The political elite’s 
cultural exclusivity cut ordinary people out of the elite’s decision making process. 
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This mirrors what Yanni Kotsonis found of agrarian policymakers in the pre-
revolutionary period, but is of particular importance in the democratised climate of 
the revolutionary period. In 1917, the political elite’s unwillingness to recognise 
peasants as autonomous political actors left them unable to integrate real peasant 
concerns into their policies, and contributed to the political elite’s inability to mobilise 
the rural population to actively support their vision of the state. This problem cut 
across classes and parties, as liberals and socialists, workers and intelligentsia alike 
struggled to win active support from the rural population.  
Orlando Figes’ important article on peasant understandings of revolutionary 
language in 1997 encouraged historians of the revolutionary period to reconsider 
communications between the political elite and ordinary people. A number of recent 
works have developed, in different ways, the sense that ordinary people came into 
their own as political actors in the course of World War One. Joshua Sanborn has 
explored ordinary people’s transformation from subjects to citizens in his work on 
military service, while Melissa Stockdale’s work on women soldiers shows how 
ordinary women sought to participate in the defence of the nation as full citizens. In 
his work on adult education programmes, Scott Seregny has shown how ordinary 
rural people became increasingly engaged with national questions in the course of the 
First World War.4 Aaron Retish, in his study of the Viatka peasantry in the 
revolutionary period, found that peasants, alongside political elites, sought to shape 
and form a new political world.5 Michael Hickey’s work on Smolensk in the 
revolutionary period has made sense of ordinary people’s political behaviour, and 
shown them to be rational poltical actors.6  
This article builds on these research findings that have interpreted ordinary 
people’s understandings of the revolution in a more positive light, and that see 
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ordinary people actively shaping their own notions of citizenship and their place in 
the nation. This study’s focus on local issues and on 1917 in particular allows it to 
make a contribution to this discourse, as it exposes the ways that ordinary people 
appropriated cultural enlightenment programmes, and took over hegemony in the 
political sphere. We will start by outlining the identities and preconceptions of 
cultural enlightenment campaigners, and the disparities in their understandings of the 
rural population. This leads on to an analysis of the means utilised by the political 
elite to communicate with ordinary people. Finally, this article will look in detail at 
Kazan’s grain producers, whom cultural enlightenment campaigners strove, and 
ultimately failed to ‘educate’ on the efficacy of the grain monopoly. 7 I argue that 
there were clear and effective paths of communication between the political elite and 
ordinary people, and that ordinary people engaged actively in the political sphere. The 
political elite’s programmes were formed from the notion of an ignorant, childlike, 
unresponsive rural population, and they failed to respond to ordinary people’s real 
political needs. Ordinary people consciously rejected the elite’s political vision and its 
proposed cultural transformation. In so doing they condemned the Provisional 
Government’s democratic dreams to failure.  
TRANSFORMING PHILISTINES 
Cultural enlightenment campaigns addressed peasants, workers and soldiers in 
towns and in the countryside. In Nizhegorod and Kazan, the cultural enlightenment 
campaigns were dominated by the town- based soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ 
deputies, and though they were actually most active in urban areas, their rhetoric 
targeted  the rural population specifically. A wide range of different organisations and 
institutions threw themselves into cultural-enlightenment work in 1917, headed by the 
Provisional Government and soviets. At local level, the regional soviets played the 
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most important role in funding, organising and co-ordinating cultural enlightenment 
campaigns. Though these groups harboured very different aspirations regarding the 
outcome and content of cultural enlightenment, they all contributed to the general 
goals of literacy, political education and cultural transformation. As Dan Orlovsky has 
shown, the Provisional Government addressed cultural and educational issues from its 
inception, but essentially did no more than encourage and expand the pre-
revolutionary educational efforts of the zemstva in village primary education. Its 
goals, of general education and literacy, were very much in the pre-revolutionary 
liberal tradition, and did not envisage a profound transformation of cultural models.8 
The activities that went on at local level in some respects reflected the Provisional 
Government’s attempts, but were more ambitious, and sought to transform ordinary 
people’s cultural landscape. The state-centred political elite that was willing and eager 
to use coercion identified in Peter Holquist’s work did not feature among these local 
level cultural enlightenment campaigners.9 
At local level, the soviet-led ‘committees of cultural-enlightenment’ were the 
most prominent organisation, and provided an umbrella for a diverse range of other 
public organisations that sought to become involved in cultural-enlightenment work. 
A wide range of groups involved in popular organisation played a part, running 
courses, meetings, literacy programmes and spectacles. To give an example of the 
range involved, eighteen different public organisations and political parties delegated 
representatives to the Kazan soviet’s cultural-enlightenment section. They give us a 
good indication of the sectors of society involved in the dissemination of cultural 
enlightenment. They included the Society of public universities, the society of young 
teachers, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, the party of independent 
socialists, workers’ club, the Polish democratic organisation, the socialist committee 
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of Muslims, the peasant group, student co-operative, union of teachers, union of 
military medical assistants, union of zemstvo employees, the society of Volga 
minority nationalities, the organisation of evacuated military in Kazan town, Kazan 
university and the women in higher education group.10 These groups defied 
straightforward class categorisations. Though they were predominantly intelligentsia 
in background, there were also large numbers of urban workers and soldiers involved 
in the campaigns.  
Despite their diverse background, educators shared a conceptualisation of the 
role of educators in 1917 as an external influence, moulding and leading the so-called 
‘dark people’ (temnyi narod) of Russia’s countryside. Both Provisional Government 
and soviet sources demonstrate this attitude towards the enlightenment campaigns, 
and it was targeted specifically at the rural population. The political elite perceived 
the drive for enlightenment in the countryside as an alien imposition, and in no way 
an organic development. Provisional Government intellectuals saw rural 
enlightenment campaigns as ‘the imposition of an alien world upon little-understood 
peasants’.11 This lack of connection with rural life cut across class delineations, and 
was felt by the ‘democratic’ soviets as well as by the ‘bourgeois’ Provisional 
Government. The cultural enlightenment commission of the soviets of soldiers and 
workers’ deputies in Nizhnii Novgorod published a frantic appeal in August for 
assistance in the task of ‘bringing light to the darkness’:  
Working intelligentsia of Nizhnii Novgorod! If you have free time, and you want to use it in 
the struggle with darkness, take part in the work of the enlightenment commission of 
Nizhegorod soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies. In this terrible hour, the living word of 
enlightenment can carry out true struggle with the darkness that is our bitterest enemy…12 
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The soviet’s appeal has an apocalyptic and evangelical feel, of enlightenment 
as an externally led crusade against the forces of darkness within village life. This 
corresponded with the views expressed by the Provisional Government led bodies. 
Enlightenment campaigns usually originated in town based organisations. The ‘gulf’ 
to be spanned was not between educated society and the people (narod) so much as 
between urban and rural cultures. Much of the contemporary debate centred around 
how the enlightenment campaigns could penetrate the villages more successfully, and 
why their successes seemed so limited. The very positioning of enlightenment as an 
external force offers one powerful explanation. The outsider bringing knowledge and 
light into the benighted villages was not a model that lent itself well to engaging with 
ordinary people. 
Party politics saturated the political elite in 1917, and this was reflected in 
cultural enlightenment campaigns, despite the emphasis in educational literature that 
cultural-enlightenment programmes should be non-partisan in their treatment of 
political issues.13 It is a reflection of the mood of 1917 that cultural enlightenment 
literature was exclusively socialist, and assumed socialist development as both 
necessary and beneficial. None of the mainstream cultural enlightenment material 
propounded a liberal-capitalist perspective. This reflects the hijacking of ‘democracy’ 
by socialist parties, and the direct association of democracy only with socialism.14 The 
main socialist parties all affiliated with the soviet’s cultural enlightenment section in 
Kazan and Nizhegorod, and some of them operated very effectively as educators, 
particularly when they utilised existing networks of support. The Socialist 
Revolutionary Party (PSR) was the only mainstream party to concern itself directly 
with the rural population, and to have a strong base of rural support. As such, the PSR 
offered the possibility of cultural enlightenment campaigning that spoke more directly 
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to the needs of a rural audience. The PSR campaigned actively in Nizhegorod and 
Kazan, and its efforts were not restricted to narrow discussion of the party 
programme, but encompassed more general themes. At meetings held by the PSR in 
Nizhegorod guberniia during 1917, the topics covered were wide ranging and 
reflected the topics covered by cultural enlightenment literature.15 
Educational campaigns were undertaken by the disparate groups associated 
with the political elite in the heartfelt belief that education could ‘transform’ Russia’s 
population into newly fledged democratic citizens, who could participate in the 
building of an egalitarian, even utopian, state. They sought to re-forge Russia’s 
ordinary people in a new form, to replace old cultural forms and norms with urban, 
enlightened and democratic values. This emphasis on ‘transformation’ lies at the heart 
of the problems for Russia’s political elite in 1917. The new revolutionary regime 
required conscious citizens, but the political elite did not recognise the majority of 
Russia’s ordinary people as conscious citizens. They were ‘philistines’, who needed 
to be taught, corrected, tutored, guided.  
Cultural enlightenment campaigns sought to increase the opportunities for 
reading and learning available to Russia’s working population, urban and rural. This 
aspect of the campaigns built on pre-revolutionary activities like workers’ schools and 
societies for adult education, and the formation of ‘popular universities’ in the pre-
revolutionary period.16 Unlike the pre-revolutionary educators, however, 1917’s 
cultural enlightenment programmes sought to transform the cultural world for 
ordinary people. The establishment of libraries and ‘people’s houses’ (narodnyi dom) 
in towns, and reading rooms in villages were intended to facilitate this cultural 
transformation.17 The importance of such establishments was not just as a place to 
access books, but also as an environment for learning, and as a social space to interact 
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with other conscious citizens. The ambitions of educational campaigns to draw 
ordinary people into the sphere of civil life were made explicit. The instilling of 
citizens’ values was inseparable from the more straightforward objective of improving 
literacy levels and access to books. Public libraries and spaces were to provide a new 
forum for conscious, civilised Russia. Existing public gathering spaces of bars and 
taverns were explicitly challenged by these new, more worthy meeting places:  
There must be a tearoom in the narodnyi dom, where local residents can go to sit in their 
spare time, have a chat with one another. At the moment, people go to the tavern or the 
teashop, which is like a tavern; the cursing in such teashops is heard ceaselessly, it’s dirty all 
around, vodka or spirit is often drunk there. The tearoom in a narodnyi dom is not like that at 
all; it’s clean, bright and comfortable, there are no drunkards, no swearing; there are 
newspapers and journals on the table. There one is enticed to rest and to peacefully chat with 
one another…18 
This statement of aspiration for the narodnyi dom reveals much of what the 
cultural enlightenment campaigns sought to address. Swearing, dirt and alcohol were 
all implicitly identified as undesirable aspects of Russian life that needed to be 
reformed. This was not a matter of giving skills of literacy in order that people could 
form their own ideas and make their own political decisions. The aim was rather a 
total transformation of societal norms and behaviour. There are clear continuities from 
the pre-revolutionary aspirations of educators, who sought not just to impart literacy 
but also to transform society.19 The establishment of narodnyi dom at volost and uezd 
levels usually by the newly formed committees of public safety can be seen in this 
context, as attempts to shape the peasant class anew. It is hard to envisage them living 
up to their lofty ambitions.20 Ordinary people sought to be informed about the new 
political climate, while the political elite sought to transform their cultural world, and 
to define their relationship with the revolutionary state.   
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THE ‘DARK’ PEOPLE ? 
Contemporaries interpreted the failure of some aspects of the elite’s education 
programmes as evidence of the ignorance and unculturedness of the Russian 
population. The ‘dark’, ‘uncultured’ ‘ignorant’ nature of ordinary people, particularly 
in the villages, were consistent tropes used by the political elite. This figurative 
language helps us understand the attitudes that the political elites took towards those 
they sought to educate. The political elite’s deep seated and self perpetuating belief in 
rural backwardness served only to alienate and distance them from ordinary people.21 
The Kazan soviet of workers, soldiers and peasants’ deputies’ cultural enlightenment 
section offers a typical expression of this desire to instil political literacy among 
ordinary people; ‘Democracy will only be invincible when it is formed from itself, 
and organised into one united army. For this it is necessary that all the labouring 
masses (trudiashchiisia massa) are deeply inspired by conscious public interests and 
have fixed ideas about their aims.’22 The language of this statement is combative and 
determined, demanding as it does that ordinary people consciously embrace ‘public 
interests’, to be defined by the soviet itself. Cultural enlightenment campaigns sought 
to prescribe to ordinary people the definition of their best interests. Through this, the 
political elite sought to direct the course of the revolution.  
The pervasive negative attitudes of the political elite towards the rural 
population reveal how deluded they were in their conceptions of the rural population. 
Parallels with the 1873-4 ‘Going to the people’ (khozhdenie v narod) show that the 
attitudes of the political elite towards ordinary people were relatively unchanged over 
the intervening forty-five years. The ‘Going to the people’ movement describes the 
actions of some thousands of intelligentsia, mainly students, who went to live and 
work in the countryside in order to spread the gospel of revolution among peasants, 
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and thus to pay back the ‘debt’ owed to the peasantry. Both in the 1870s and in 1917, 
enlighteners aimed for a utopian transformation of the state, and an attempt to bridge 
the gulf between educated society and ordinary people.23 The Populists of the 1870s 
sought to resolve the conflict between state and society by using the might of the 
peasantry to transform the state through revolution. In 1917, however, the political 
elite sought to draw the peasantry into a new civil society that would solidify the 
revolutionary transformation of the state.24 Though by 1917 there were significant 
developments away from the perceptions of the 1870s, many underlying assumptions 
continued to reflect much older ideas about the nature of the peasantry, and on 
essentially hierarchical understandings of culture.25 The most important of these was 
the idea that the peasantry was essentially ‘dark’, unable to escape from their poverty 
with their own intellectual resources, and that they required external agents to lead 
them out of their benighted position.26 
Ordinary rural people to some extent themselves perpetuated these 
conceptions of the dark countryside. The change of regime presaged by the February 
revolution unleashed a barrage of proclamations, appeals, newspapers, leaflets and 
pamphlets into the villages. A prominent feature of reports and documentation from 
the villages was the appeals and comments from the peasants themselves commenting 
on their ‘darkness’ and ignorance of current affairs, and their requests for assistance in 
understanding current events. Such self-descriptions of ‘darkness’ from the villagers 
cannot be taken at face value. Peasants themselves utilised stereotypes of the ‘dark 
peasantry’ in their discourse with educated society, but we cannot impute from this 
that the peasantry were actually ignorant and childlike. It was rather that they utilised 
understood tropes as the most effective means of communication.27 Despite this 
caveat, reports from the villages repeatedly stressed the need for educated people to 
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come to the assistance of the rural population. Soldier deputies from the Nizhegorod 
soviet of workers’ deputies travelled around Sergachskii uezd in May. Their reports in 
the soviet newspaper described the archetypal ‘dark’ countryside:  
Peasants complained that they were forgotten by the town and didn’t know anything; wanted 
to know everything about past and forthcoming events. Newspapers and leaflets are needed. 
Among listeners were eighty year olds as well as seventy year olds. In general one has to say 
that there was virtually no youth in the countryside and in the villages youth was not seen at 
all.28 
By 1917, the Russian village was no longer the hermetically sealed nineteenth 
century enclave that the political elite envisaged. Villages had been increasingly 
‘opened’ to outside influences, and peasants were drawn into the public sphere by the 
turn of the century,29 facilitated by the spread of literacy and education.30 The 
outbreak of World War One and accompanying mass mobilisation intensified village 
connections with the outside world, as it exposed a significant proportion of young 
men to the wider world, and gave the village population a new incentive to engage 
with national issues. 31 The war transformed national politics into a sphere intricately 
associated with peasants’ daily lives.32 In conscripting young men, wartime 
mobilisation removed the most literate segment of the village community,33 making 
the skills of literacy a precious commodity.34 The rural intelligentsia, who were 
targeted by the political elite as the ideal harbingers of enlightenment in the 
countryside, had exactly the skills of literacy that villages apparently cried out for. 
They should have been the perfect agents for enlightenment. The rural intelligentsia 
was specifically mentioned in appeals from villagers to help them understand current 
events. The elder of Khvostikovskii volost executive committee, Semenovskii uezd, 
appealed specifically to those individuals who lived in the volost but were not strictly 
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members of the commune, such as priests, teachers and shop managers, to take part in 
a meeting held on 14 March to form the volost executive committee and the volost 
militia.35 Despite this appeal, of the twenty-three members of the Khvostikovskii 
volost executive committee subsequently formed, all but two (the volost scribe and a 
housekeeper) were peasants. All were men.36 Local male peasants dominated the 
village’s formal political power structures in 1917.  Despite an apparent awareness 
from peasants of the need for rural intelligentsia involvement, the domination of the 
new administrative structures by male peasants perpetuated traditional village power 
structures. The rural population did not allow the rural intelligentsia hegemony in 
village life.  
TALKING TO THE PEOPLE 
The political elite utilised a range of means in communicating with ordinary 
people in 1917. Though they perceived that their most serious barriers in transforming 
society was how they could communicate their message to ordinary people, especially 
in the countryside, we see that language was not an insuperable barrier for educators 
in the countryside. Much of 1917’s educational literature focused on the means that 
could be used to communicate with the rural population, and to bridge the gulf 
between the language of the villages and the language of the revolution, which often 
utilised abstract or foreign terminology. Orlando Figes wrote about the purported gulf 
between peasant understandings of the revolution and the world around them, and the 
understandings and expectations of their would-be educators. This issue of 
communication with ordinary people is an important one, which requires further 
exploration. Michael Hickey’s work on worker and soldier activists in the villages has 
already shown that at least some rural agitators spoke to peasants in language they 
understood.37 Educational literature produced specifically to guide educators in their 
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activities contained genuine and well grounded attempts to conduct educational 
activity in language and in forms that would be understood and accepted in the 
villages. Figes used a number of anecdotes taken from educational literature of 
peasant ignorance about key revolutionary words and concepts, alongside the reports 
of State Duma deputies visiting the countryside in the first three months after the 
February revolution.38 These anecdotes do not prove that peasants did not understand 
the language of 1917, but showed rather that educators were aware of the limitations 
and desires of their audience. Educational literature offered diverse alternatives of 
how to best communicate with rural people. Cultural enlightenment events were held 
regularly and enjoyed enormous popularity in towns and countryside.  
Educational literature stressed the need to adopt emotional, localist and non-
conceptual arguments when addressing a peasant audience. The examples given in the 
educational literature and used by Figes of how peasants misunderstood foreign words 
and concepts were given specifically so that such pitfalls could be avoided. Lecturers 
were beseeched to speak in accessible and engaging ways:  
You must force your listeners not only to listen, but also to experience everything you speak 
about, not just to understand, but also to feel. For this, your exposition must be clear and 
simple; the argument must occupy a lesser place in your words as far as is possible, attention 
must be paid predominantly to examples, and especially examples from regional life.39 
Lecturers were warned specifically not to use foreign or unfamiliar terms in 
their speeches, to illustrate them profusely with living examples from Russian peasant 
life, and to engage not so much in lectures as in conversation with the listeners. 
Questions from the audience were answered in an informal way, by ‘going down into 
the crowd of listeners, and when receiving a question from an individual, answer very 
loudly, so that the answer could be heard by other people around.’40 Cultural 
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enlightenment literature left nothing to chance. Specific examples were given of how 
to respond to common questions, and how to explain abstract concepts in terms that 
peasants would understand. 
The political elite recognised that literacy campaigns needed to cater for the 
non-Russian community as well as to ethnic Russians. Real efforts were made to 
educate and communicate with non-Russians in 1917.  Kazan’s non-Russian 
population, including Tatars, Chuvash and Cheremis, all with different languages and 
alphabets, posed a particular challenge. These groups were regarded by the local 
political elites as the ‘darkest’ elements of the rural population, and the most difficult 
to reach. The Tatar community had a history of hostility to state and external 
influences. From 1827 onwards, clumsy efforts had been made by the state to convert 
apostatised Tatars, and defectors were forcibly resettled or exiled. This experience left 
the Tatar community particularly hostile to state intervention.41 Attempts to access 
non-Russian rural communities were hindered by a shortage of personnel with the 
necessary language skills and cultural awareness. The army provided more fertile 
ground for cultural work. The literacy school set up by the  soviet’s cultural 
enlightenment committee and officers and soldiers of the 94th regiment stationed in 
Kazan town, for example, opened four schools for the regiment, divided by 
nationality; Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian and Chuvash. Of the 557 identified illiterates in 
the regiment, 227 enrolled in the schools, while the school’s teachers came from the 
ranks of the officers and soldiers themselves.42 The ethnic divisions here reflect an 
important aspect of cultural enlightenment activities in Kazan. This example also 
blurs the distinction between educators and pupils, as teachers and pupils lived and 
worked together.  
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Educational campaigns were not restricted to speeches, written material and 
general haranguing in their attempts to communicate with ordinary people. Aaron 
Retish has shown how the political elite in Viatka province utilised ceremony, public 
holidays and their links with the Orthodox Church to educate the population, and 
through this education to dictate the form of revolutionary citizenship.43  used a broad 
range of means in its quest to culturally transform Russia, including theatre, songs and 
spectacles. As with other fields of activity, these activities were continuations of pre-
revolutionary elite activities,44 and used symbols and means that were familiar to their 
audience. The more elaborate media of spectacle and theatre were most frequently 
seen in urban settings, since towns provided a larger audience and more amenable 
environment for such activities. In urban settings, there were a range of commercial 
entertainments on offer whose outputs overlapped with the explicitly cultural-
enlightenment activities organised by the political elite. In the villages and 
countryside, more limited avenues of enlightenment were utilised, but they were 
varied none the less.  
A striking feature of cultural enlightenment work was the way in which the 
wholesome messages it wished to convey were sweetened with music and simple 
joys. Singing, theatre, public spectacles and funfairs were all regarded as important 
vehicles for the enlightenment process. These forms of entertainment tell us about 
how ordinary people used familiar, symbolic and entertaining forms of expression, as 
well as about how the political elite sought to construct these forms. The celebrations 
held by the 164th regiment in Kazan in commemoration of the revolution used colour, 
song, music and group activities to engage with its audience. For the occasion, on 9 
April, the barracks were carefully decorated with pictures, placards and flags. General 
Myshlaevskyi, commander of the region, watched the regiment perform manoeuvres, 
  18 
then the band played the marseillaise. There was a succession of speeches, and the 
regiment shouted ‘URA!’ repeatedly together. In the evening, there was a ‘diversion’, 
with music, songs and verses, and the evening was ended with a display of 
fireworks.45 Though on one level, these events were ‘simple pleasures’, and 
straightforward entertainment, on another they offered a forum for ordinary people to 
learn about and identify with the new regime.  
Among the most frequent events held in the towns were general spectacles, 
variously called ‘funfair-lottery-concerts’ (narodnoe gulian’e-loteriia-kontserti). In 
Nizhnii Novgorod, for example, the soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies 
organised a ‘grand funfair-lottery-concert’ to raise funds for the soviet, held in the 
gardens of the Kremlin (renamed the ‘Gardens of Freedom’) on the last Sunday in 
May. This started with a morning of ‘children’s events’, then progressed to a lottery, 
cinematograph, buffet, and concluded with ‘grandiose fireworks’.46 The entrance fee 
raised significant funds for the soviet. Spectacles of this nature were features of 
Kazan’s cultural life too. The Kazan soviet’s cultural enlightenment section held a 
fund raising day for the soviet on 10 September that involved a succession of 
concerts, spectacles, bazaars and lotteries. An orchestra played military music all day 
long, which ‘was a great success’, and the halls were decorated with flowers, greenery 
and coloured lights.47 These spectacles were not just fund raising events. By engaging 
with the population in this way, campaigners sought to create an alternative set of 
rituals, and to establish a fresh cultural environment that could move ordinary people 
away from the dirty, ‘uncultured’ teashops and taverns that were the alternative 
focuses of Russia’s popular cultural life. 
The efforts of the soviet’s cultural enlightenment section were supplemented 
by events organised by a whole range of other groups. In Kazan, for example, the ‘old 
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PSR group’ organised a number of grand ‘revolutionary evenings’ that offer some 
indication both of the diversity and the popularity of these events. The ‘revolution 
evening’ held on 26 April was extensively advertised, and boasted a guest appearance 
from Ekaterina Breshkovskaia, as well as a ‘no-loss’ lottery, two orchestras, a theatre 
of miniatures, a ‘cloth village’, drama, comedy, cabaret, diversions and pictures.48 
The tickets were all sold by 13 April, and a second showing was offered for the 27 
April in response to demand.49 The day after the event, a fiercely critical letter about 
the event was printed in the local soviet newspaper Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta. 
Breshkovskaia had not attended, there had been extensive speeches from senior 
regional SRs, and the character of the evening had been a political propaganda 
opportunity rather than an evening’s light entertainment. As if that were not enough, it 
was alleged that the verses recited were pre-revolutionary, and praised Nicholas II! 
The organisers were forced to address the discontented audience directly, and rather 
provocatively suggested that ‘if you don’t like it, you can leave’.50 This is an 
illuminating exchange, and offers rare feedback on the reception of such events. The 
hostile response of the public leaves no doubt that they were a highly critical and 
aware audience, who had high expectations and were not fobbed off with thinly veiled 
educational material. 
Concerts and theatrical performances were frequent in Nizhnii Novgorod and 
Kazan towns, and were enthusiastically attended by the town’s population. Some of 
these were commercial ventures, and some were commissioned by the soviet. Such 
performances attracted daily reviews in the socialist press.51 There were precedents in 
the pre-revolutionary period of high cultural fare as vehicles for political education,52 
and the relationship between popular opinion and commercial culture became more 
intense through 1917.53 Educational literature was very specific in its suggestions of 
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how to stage plays as part of cultural enlightenment programmes. In theatre, efforts 
were made to make these cultural experiences as accessible as possible for audiences 
not necessarily familiar with theatre. Plays were to be amusing, not too long and 
sufficiently simple that they could be effectively staged with a small cast, and without 
expensive and complicated props. There were even plays written especially for 
revolutionary events that recounted the events of revolution in dramatic form, and that 
cast Kerensky in the leading role.54 Theatre became increasingly politicised, and 
scenes from the young revolution were added to new productions.55  
These revolutionary diversions were not always very professional, but this 
only emphasised their ‘democratic’ nature. They also reiterate that these events were 
not always orchestrated by the political elite, but could reflect ordinary people’s 
involvement in cultural enlightenment. At a soviet organised ‘soldiers’ evening’ held 
in Nizhnii Novgorod to celebrate the first day of Easter a play was staged as well as 
singing and dancing. Workers as well as soldiers attended. A reviewer noted 
charitably that the first performers were ‘not at all bad’, and that with ‘only a small 
effort’ they became quite good. One of the performers, a chemist called Roznatovskii, 
was commended specially for his free and simple speech in his roles as Dan and 
Shulygin.56  These enlightening performances were a very prominent feature of city 
life; a glance at the advertising in newspapers shows that hardly a day went by 
without a performance of some description. Such amateur efforts are strong 
indications that some aspects of the cultural enlightenment literature were being 
observed; this was ‘people’s theatre’, speaking to ordinary people in language they 
understood. 57 They also reiterate that the political elite did not have hegemony in 
cultural enlightenment, and ordinary people themselves engaged in the process of 
bringing enlightenment and interpreting the revolution.  
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The use of music as a means to engage ordinary people in educational efforts 
was well established. Listening to, and participating in, sung prayers was an integral 
part of the orthodox faith, and a part that many ordinary people enjoyed best.58 
Medynskii’s guide to establishing village cultural enlightenment activities proposed 
that any efforts should commence with the establishment of a village choir, and most 
programmes of entertainment and education involved music as well.59 The memoirs 
of N. Sukhanov, a deserter in 1917, describe how he organised a demonstration in 
Saralovskii volost, Laishevskii uezd, Kazan. He had planned a rousing chorus of the 
Marseillaise, but was thwarted as no one knew the words.60 There were also touring 
musical performances, which were hugely popular. The Volynskii regiment’s 
orchestra, of which more than half the members had higher musical education, for 
example, visited Nizhnii Novgorod twice in the course of its national tour, and was 
enthusiastically welcomed. Their performance was supplemented by a meeting, at 
which political themes were addressed.61 Even without the addition of political 
meetings, these musical evenings carried political and ideological significance. Iakov 
Posen, the director of Kazan’s town orchestra, responded to criticisms that his musical 
programme was too highbrow in a letter to the local soviet newspaper. Posen appealed 
to the newspaper’s readers to tell him what was wrong with his musical programme, 
which included Robespierre’s revolutionary overture, Chopin’s funeral march, and 
pieces from Glazunov, Rimskii Korsakov and Kochetov.62 These musical 
performances were politicised, like other areas of cultural life, and exposed to popular 
criticism.  
The sometimes elaborate manifestations described above were predominantly 
city-based events. Events were organised in the countryside, but they tended to be 
much simpler in form, reflecting the practical difficulties of organising in the villages. 
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In towns, the political elite who orchestrated education campaigns drew on a pool of 
educated people and an existing network of cultural facilities such as theatres, public 
spaces and concert halls. Urban dwellers were liable to be better educated as a group, 
more culturally aware, and more amenable to education programmes.63 The process of 
enlightenment in rural areas raised specific problems. The rural population was 
geographically dispersed, which made it more difficult to reach, and were generally 
less cosmopolitan and had lower levels of formal education. To compound matters, 
there was a dearth of educated people to initiate such programmes in rural areas. That 
said, rural based events shared features with the more sophisticated city events, 
utilising music, colour, entertainment and group activities to mobilise participants. 
Demonstrations and celebrations of freedom and the revolution were held in many 
villages. They often involved a march around the streets of the village carrying 
coloured flags and placards, and concluded with speeches from prominent locals and 
outside agitators. The village priest frequently played an important role in such 
procedures, saying a prayer to open events.64 In Bolshe Akhmutov village, 
Sergachskii uezd, Nizhegorod guberniia, the priest even blessed the red flag with holy 
water in preparation for a visit by soldier deputies from the soviet.65 The participation 
of the priest offered villagers a reassuring air of continuity; just as he had led and 
participated in pre-revolutionary festivals and events, so his role in the revolutionary 
proceedings lent an air of normality to the new era.66 
The most important, and most widely advertised, public holiday of 1917 was 
that called to celebrate May Day. This socialist holiday provided an opportunity for a 
wide range of public consciousness ranging activities. The socialist parties, alongside 
the soviet’s cultural enlightenment section, played the most prominent role in bringing 
the celebrations to fruition. May Day, held on 18 April to coincide with the Julian 
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calendar, was widely advertised and reported in the socialist press. Reports came in 
from towns and villages on the size and success of the May Day holidays. The holiday 
was imbued with different meanings according to the agenda of the organiser. Most 
widely, it was used to celebrate Russia’s newfound political freedom, and to herald 
the unity of working peoples. At the celebrations held by the Sormovo and Kanavin 
factories in Nizhnii Novgorod, around 80,000 people attended, carrying 150 flags.67 
These banners defined the procession of the demonstration, and the banners denoted a 
range of different affiliations, with party devices an important feature of affairs: 
Slowly and solemnly, in immaculate order, the dense columns of workers and citizens 
advanced. Every factory shop came forward separately with their banners, and every party 
section under the leadership of its representatives. The PSR’s workers’ and peasants’ 
organisations presented their own especially beautiful picture. The whole banner was 
embroidered and painted with loving care with the party’s devices and slogans- “In struggle 
you will get your rights”, “Land and freedom” and others- these swayed over harmonious 
columns of thousands of organised comrades. In every hand, on every breast, in every 
buttonhole, were red bands, bows, ribbons with party initials and divisions. . .’68 
In Kazan, the dominant Menshevik group in Kazan tried to harness the 
goodwill generated by the event to solder over the factions in the Social Democratic 
party.69 The Kazan celebrations included a procession around town. The town’s 
different party groups all formed, and were greeted with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm by the procession of workers and soldiers.70 As well as events organised 
by the soviet, political parties took advantage of the heightened political mood to hold 
meetings throughout the day. This was a forum for political competition as well as for 
working solidarity. There was hostility, for example, between the ‘bourgeois’ 
‘Ittifaku-Musilmin’ (Tatar nationalist party) and the Muslim socialist committee, 
which held competing meetings throughout the day.71 The May Day celebrations 
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provided a forum for ordinary people to participate in the new revolutionary state, and 
to hear the political elite’s interpretations of the new political order.  
 ORDINARY PEOPLE AS POLITICAL ACTORS 
The political elite clearly utilised a wide range of measures to communicate 
with ordinary people, and to engage them with, and educate them in, the new political 
order. Despite these apparently successful efforts, the political elite were unable to 
lead and direct ordinary people’s interpretations of the new order.. The inability of the 
political elite to exercise leadership over ordinary people had serious and immediate 
implications for local and national government alike. Ordinary people were 
successfully drawn into the political sphere, and participated in regional and national 
elections. No amount of education, however, could convince ordinary people either to 
respect private property, or to accept what they perceived to be the unfair market 
established by fixed prices. I will conclude by exploring the political elite’s 
unsuccessful attempts to implement of the grain monopoly in  Kazan guberniia. The 
Provisional Government’s grain monopoly, whereby all surplus was compulsorily 
purchased by the state at fixed prices, provoked hostility and non-cooperation in many 
uezds of Kazan, and resistance was particularly virulent in non-Russian regions. 
Attempts to win villagers’ co-operation with education programmes routinely failed. 
Kazan uezd provisions administration, for example, reported to the guberniia 
provisions committee on 12 July that the population categorically refused to 
implement the grain monopoly, and that only strong military force could implement 
the grain monopoly. In a number of volosts, provisions educators were beaten and 
terrorised. Most communities refused to organise provisions committees, and where 
they did exist, as in Baltasynskii volost, they were re-elected and themselves opposed 
the grain monopoly. 72 When a provisions instructor came to Baltasynskii in August, 
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he was told to address ‘requests’ for fixed prices to the commune council, and the 
Tatar villagers said, ‘we will submit to the law, but we won’t submit to norms of 
consumption and fixed prices.’73 This situation did not improve in the uezd. Kazan’s 
uezd commissar wrote to the guberniia commissar at the start of September that he 
had met extreme hostility when trying to defend the grain monopoly in Kliuchei 
village, Kudmorskii volost, and had been forced to run away.74 
Other uezds were even more violent and confrontational towards the educators 
sent to the villages. In Iadrinskii uezd, where large quantities of grain were being 
illegally exported to neighbouring uezds, most volosts issued categorical refusals to 
carry out the grain monopoly or to organise volost provisions committees. In a 
number of villages, the mood was described as ‘extremely dangerous’.75 
Representatives of the Kazan soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies visited 
Alikovskii volost, Iadrinskii uezd, in an attempt to educate the population on the grain 
monopoly. A meeting was held in the Chuvash village Al’kov on 25 July. Around two 
thousand people attended, and when delegates began to speak of the need to organise 
committees, a crowd of around two hundred people, reportedly dominated by 
deserters armed with sticks and bottles, came forward and beat three of the delegates 
up. When the local intelligentsia, including teachers and a priest, protested at the 
violence, they were also attacked. Only one of the soviet delegates managed to run 
away. The disorder went on from ten in the morning till three in the afternoon. By the 
time armed assistance turned up at four in the afternoon, the crowd had mostly 
dispersed. Thirty-seven people were subsequently arrested and taken to Iadrinskii 
prison by an armed convoy of soldiers.76  
The faith of Kazan’s regional administration in the efficacy of education was 
understandably dimmed by the open resistance their programmes faced. In July, 
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Kazan’s united provisions meeting was forced to conclude that seizure of grain 
backed by armed force was the only way to extract grain from the region’s peasants.77 
This does not reflect a willingness to use coercion to implement policy, as Holquist 
argued, but rather was a measure borne of utter desperation, as local educators and 
administrators were physically attacked and threatened. Even then, the belief that 
education would resolve food supply problems was tenacious, and reluctance or 
refusal to use force against the population persisted. Alexander Kolegaev, leader of 
the Kazan SRs, and later a leading light of the Left SRs, travelled around Kazan’s 
countryside in early summer and invoked the now familiar tropes of darkness to 
explain peasant resistance. Kolegaev argued that the beating and violence meted out 
to those trying to administer the census and grain monopoly in Koz’modem’ianskii 
uezd had its origins in ignorance, or ‘darkness’. Kolegaev’s impression was that 
dialogue, without the presence of soldiers, would resolve matters.78 The situation in 
Koz’modem’ianskii uezd by September indicates that Kolegaev’s faith in education 
was misplaced. Despite the efforts of soviet sponsored educational campaigns, 
violence and resistance in the uezd continued unabated. 79  
The belief that ordinary people resisted government policy because they did 
not know or understand it proved to be surprisingly durable, even in the face of 
conscious and concerted resistance from ordinary people. By September, a coalition 
of left SRs and Bolsheviks had taken control of Kazan guberniia’s provisions 
administration. Their attitude towards the use of armed force and arrests in the 
countryside was ambiguous. While in principle they supported the use of force as 
their predecessors had, they laboured under the delusion that resistance to grain 
monopoly was carried out by a minority, and that most peasants were simply 
unenlightened. Kolegaev, commenting on the unrest in Spasskii uezd in July reiterated 
  27 
that ‘even if they are dark, they are still our comrades. We cannot go to them with 
armed force.’80 As the summer progressed, and the grain monopoly continued to 
crumble, Kolegaev and his comrades came to support punitive measures in the 
countryside, which they justified as actions against the ‘wealthy minority’ that they 
asserted were behind the problems. The Nizhegorod soviet of workers and soldiers’ 
deputies also called for the use of soldiers against peasants withholding grain as the 
summer progressed.81 This reflected a national shift towards desperate measures for 
grain procurement, but does not suggest that the political elite embraced coercion 
freely.82 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aims of cultural enlightenment campaigners were far-reaching and 
ambitious. They sought to engender a fundamental transformation of Russian socio-
political life, using the gains of the February revolution as a starting point, and 
education as the lynchpin of their efforts. Their campaigns sought to bridge the gap 
between the perceptions of educated society, and those of ‘the people’. The political 
elite perceived ordinary people, especially rural ordinary people, to be childlike, 
empty vessels that could be filled with their visions of the new revolutionary order. 
They did not anticipate that their education programmes would be greeted by 
autonomous, politically aware individuals, who would make their own political 
choices. Ultimately, 1917’s drive for enlightenment was perceived by its main 
protagonists as a failure, in that ordinary people refused to endorse the Provisional 
Government’s policies, most catastrophically on grain procurement. The political 
elite’s attempts to educate the population on the grain monopoly exposed its failings 
starkly. Their problems lay not with communication, or getting ordinary people to 
engage in the political sphere, but in the content of their message. The political elite 
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could not get ordinary people to accept perceived unfair market prices in the name of 
the new Russian state. The political elites blamed their failure on the darkness and 
ignorance of ordinary people, who were purportedly unable to understand national 
needs. The notion of a ‘dark’ people was a convenient one for the political elite, as it 
enabled them to blame the population for their enduring ignorance, rather than to 
accept that ordinary people were conscious political actors who consciously rejected 
the political elite’s message.  
The cultural enlightenment campaigns of 1917 were in many respects a 
continuation of the activities of pre-revolutionary educational activists, and were able 
to tap into increasing societal interest in education. The drive for enlightenment 
witnessed in 1917 was, however, on an entirely different scale to the educational 
campaigns that had preceded it. It involved all sectors of educated society, and 
utilised a diverse array of means to forward its aims. The 1917 campaign was imbued 
with fresh urgency, as it was apparent both to Russia’s political elite and to her 
grassroots activists that if their vision of a democratic, ordered egalitarian Russia was 
to be implemented, and civil war avoided, their education campaigns had to succeed 
in enlightening the population. While cultural enlightenment campaigns were posited 
as non partisan, they actually reflected the specifically socialist climate of 
revolutionary Russia, and acted as a forum for political competition, and for partisan 
political activities.   
This study of cultural enlightenment campaigns indicates that communication 
and alien language between educators and villagers were not the fundamental 
problems that educators faced. A diverse range of educational forms were utilised in 
cultural enlightenment activities, a major feature of which was the sweetening of 
educational material with music, theatre and diversions. Public holidays, especially 
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May Day, were an imporant forum for cultural enlightenment campaigners. Cultural 
enlightenment programmes were stymied not by the language used, but by the nature 
of their goals, which sought a profound cultural transformation for Russia, into a 
society that shared the worldview and aspirations of the political elite. The political 
elite in 1917 did not contemplate violent means of enforcing this cultural 
transformation. Their avoidance of coercion rather contradicts Peter Holquist’s 
overarching synthesis of the revolutionary period, which emphasised that willingness 
to rely on the power of the state was a feature of Tsarist, Provisional Government and 
Bolshevik administrations alike. The evidence from grassroots Kazan and Nizhegorod 
indicates that the local political elites stopped short of coercion in their attempts to 
transform Russia. Even in the face of outright hostility and threats to their safety, the 
political elite clung to their faith in education. Their efforts to communicate with 
ordinary people were a success, but enlightenment for ordinary people came in forms 
that the political elite had not envisaged or desired.  
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